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Article
An Interest Balancing Test for Entrapment
John Cirace*
I. Introduction
Since the Supreme Court of the United States decided its
first entrapment case, United States v. Sorrells,' the standard
analysis of the entrapment defense in a criminal prosecution 2
has been concerned with three elements: whether the defendant
had a subjective predisposition to commit the crime; 3 whether
the defendant had an objective predisposition to commit the
crime; 4 or whether the criminal's predisposition to commit the
* Professor of Economics, The City University of New York; Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
2. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. Sor-
rells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Lester B. Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the
Federal Courts, 1 DUKE L.J. 39 (1967); Daniel. L. Rotenberg, The Police Detection
Practice of Encouragement, 4 Hous. L. REv. 609 (1967); Whilliam C. Sherrill, Jr.,
The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional Standards, 20 FLA. L. REV.
63 (1967); Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J. 1046
(1969); W. Amon Burton, Jr., Note, 45 TEx. L. REV. 578 (1967); Charles S. Mc-
Cowan, Jr., Comment, Entrapment: Instigation, Not Investigation, 26 LA. L. Rev.
848 (1960); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat - The Constitutional
Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965) [hereinafter "Serpent"].
3. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433
(1973) (acknowledging that the Sorrells Court stressed the defendant's predisposi-
tion to commit the crime); Jeffrey N. Klar, Note, The Need for a Dual Approach to
Entrapment, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 199, 200 n.10 (1981) (discussing the interpretations
of "predisposition" offered by courts and commentators).
4. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379-80 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., dissenting). More recently, the Supreme Court has stated
"that a valid entrapment defense has two related elements: government induce-
ment of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to
engage in the criminal conduct." Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
See also Brian Thomas Feeney, Note, Scrutiny for the Serpent: The Court Refines
1
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crime balances against the appropriateness of police practices.5
However, allowing evidence of a defendant's predisposition to
commit crime in entrapment cases often allows the jury to hear
testimony that is unduly prejudicial to the defendant and is ir-
relevant to the real public policy issues which concern: a) the
extent to which entrapment is necessary for efficient law en-
forcement, considering factors such as the crime's seriousness,
secrecy, and difficulty of detection; and b) the nature and extent
of government involvement, from surveillance to simple solicita-
tion to elaborate and prolonged inducement. 6 This second issue
concerns the supervisory power of courts over the administra-
tion of criminal justice7 and whether police tactics fall below
standards for the proper use of governmental power, 8 shock the
universal sense of justice, 9 or violate fundamental fairness in-
herent in the guarantee of due process. 10 The rule of law ulti-
mately depends upon "public confidence in the fair and
honorable administration of justice.""
An analysis of the six entrapment cases decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States 2 demonstrates that these
cases are more easily rationalized as a balancing via trade-offs
of the government's need for entrapment against the nature
and extent of government involvement than they are as a de-
fendant's predisposition to commit the crime. The two elements
in this balancing test derive from Justice Frankfurter's concur-
ring opinion in the second entrapment case decided by the
Supreme Court, Sherman v. United States:
Entrapment Law in Jacobson v. United States, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 1027 (1993);
infra note 46 and accompanying text.
5. See PAUL MARcus, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 1 (1989). Other tests have
been suggested. See Maura F.J. Whelan, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted) Temp-
tation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion
Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1193, 1197 (1985).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
8. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
9. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (citing Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).
10. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 491-95 (Powell, J., concurring).
11. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12. Twelve lower federal court decisions are also analyzed.
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The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must
direct itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particu-
lar case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond,
for the proper use of governmental power. For answer it is wholly
irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to commit the crime originated
with the defendant or government officers, or if the criminal con-
duct was the product of "the creative activity" of law-enforcement
officials. 13
Additionally, "It]he court should also consider the nature of the
crime involved, its secrecy and difficulty of detection, and the
manner in which the particular criminal business is usually
carried on."14
Justice Frankfurter also said that under the predisposition
test for entrapment, the jury is allowed to hear evidence of the
defendant's prior criminal record, bad reputation, and rumored
activities, of which the prosecution may have insufficient evi-
dence to obtain an indictment. The jury may even hear the gov-
ernment's motives in choosing to tempt this defendant. All of
this evidence is unduly prejudicial to the defendant. 15
Section II is concerned with the question of why a society
dedicated to the concept of ordered liberty should ever allow its
law enforcement authorities to entice citizens into criminal ac-
tivity. In Section III, it is argued that Justice Frankfurter was
correct: evidence of a criminal's predisposition to commit a
crime is both irrelevant to the two entrapment policy issues and
unduly prejudicial to the defendant. Section IV contains an in-
terest balancing (via trade-offs) analysis of the six entrapment
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. In
Figure 1,16 the six cases are depicted in terms of a trade-off be-
tween two variables: the government's need for entrapment is
ranked on the horizontal axis; the nature and extent of govern-
ment inducement is ranked on the vertical axis. In general, the
greater the need for entrapment, the easier it is for the govern-
ment to justify prolonged and elaborate schemes. In Section V,
13. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
14. Id. at 385.
15. See id. at 382; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 458 (1932) (Roberts. J.,
dissenting).
16. See infra p. 417.
19971
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it is shown how interest balancing via trade-offs can be used by
judges when they engage in line drawing, that is, the separation
of cases that should be decided one way from cases that should
be decided another way.
II. Why Allow Police to Use Entrapment?
The initial question that must be answered is: why should a
free society, dedicated to the concept of ordered liberty, ever al-
low police to set traps that induce its citizens to commit crimes?
The rationale is straight forward: crimes that are consensual
(victimless), conspiratorial, or secret in nature often will not be
exposed other than through entrapment. As Judge Learned
Hand said, "[ilndeed, it would seem probable that, if there were
no reply [to the claim of government inducement], it would be
impossible ever to secure convictions of any offences which con-
sist of transactions that are carried on in secret."17 Judge
Hand's view effectively disposes of the overbroad view of entrap-
ment espoused by Justice Roberts in his concurrence in Sorrells:
"The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the
trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents."i8
Moreover, many consensual and secret crimes are either so di-
rectly destructive to the fabric of a free society, such as the brib-
ing of public officials (judges, legislators, or civil servants), or so
indirectly destructive, such as the sale of illegal drugs, which
involve serious negative spill-overs or externalities, and which
are often financed by violent crime, that entrapment is justified
as the lesser evil.
17. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952). On remand,
the defendant was again convicted, reversing the prior conviction due to an im-
proper instruction on entrapment. See United States v. Sherman, 240 F.2d 949 (2d
Cir. 1957) rev'd 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (entrapment was established as a matter of
law). See also Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six
Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, in Federal Court, 27 WAKE
FoREST L. REV. 829, 831 (1992) (police undercover activity remains an integral
part of the overall law enforcement scheme because of the difficulty inherent in
detecting and prosecuting consensual crimes, such as drug trafficking, prostitu-
tion, gambling, and bribery).
18. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459. See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy,
60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 164 (1976); Paul W. Williams, The Defense of Entrapment
and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 403-4
(1959).
[Vol. 18:51
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Consider two extreme cases. One where the government is
usually justified in initiating elaborate and creative entrapment
schemes. For example, a "sting" operation to apprehend legisla-
tors, judges, or civil servants who accept bribes is usually justi-
fiable, even though the scheme is initiated by police authorities
and is elaborate and of prolonged duration. These crimes are
hard to detect and, if unchecked, can completely undermine
public confidence in government. In the other case, where en-
trapment can rarely be justified, police should generally not be
allowed to set a trap for someone "predisposed" to commit theft.
For example, allowing police to park an automobile, which is
unattended, unlocked, with its windows rolled down, and con-
taining an expensive camera lying on the front seat, is not justi-
fiable. Because such theft is not among consensual or
conspiratorial crimes that go unreported, or crimes of violence, 19
there is generally no need (justification) for the government to
set such traps whether or not someone is predisposed to commit
this type of theft.
The six entrapment cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States all involve consensual crimes. 20 One of those
cases, United States v. Mathews,2' involved the use of entrap-
ment to uncover alleged bribery of a government official.22 Such
crimes as this, which involve elaborate, government-initiated
entrapment schemes, are almost always justified. In four other
cases, all of which involved the sale of controlled substances,
the balance or trade-off between the government's need for en-
trapment and the degree of government inducement depended
on the facts of each case.23 Finally, in the sixth and most recent
19. Police authorities are justified in setting a trap for violent muggers who
attack unsuspecting or vulnerable individuals.
20. See United States v. Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) (receipt of child por-
nography); United States v. Mathews, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (bribery of government
officials); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (narcotics); United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (narcotics); United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369
(1958) (narcotics); United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (liquor prohibition
violation).
21. 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
22. See id. at 61.
23. See United States v. Hampton, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United
States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
1997]
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entrapment case, United States v. Jacobson,24 two federal agen-
cies, as part of an elaborate and prolonged (two and a half year)
entrapment campaign, enticed a citizen into ordering a maga-
zine containing child pornography through the mail.25 An en-
trapment scheme such as this shocks the conscience and falls
far below standards to which common feelings respond for the
proper use of governmental power. 26
III. Defendant's Predisposition to Commit Crime
is "Irrelevant"27
A. The Subjective Predisposition Theory
In Sorrells, the Supreme Court adopted what has been
called the "subjective predisposition" approach to the defense of
entrapment. The Court stated that, "the controlling question
[is] whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom
the government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense
which is the product of the creative activity of its own offi-
cials. '28 The key phrase is "otherwise innocent," because under
this test the entrapment defense is available only to those who
would not have committed the crime but for the government in-
ducement. 29 Thus, the subjective approach focuses on the con-
duct and propensities of the particular defendant in each
individual case. "[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of
entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and search-
ing inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing
upon that issue."30 Further,
[i]f he had the "predisposition" to commit the crime, or if the
"criminal design" originated with him, then-regardless of the na-
ture and extent of the Government's participation-there has
been no entrapment. And, in the absence of a conclusive showing
24. 503 U.S. 540.
25. See id.
26. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
27. Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See supra notes 13-14 and
accompanying text.
28. United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
29. See id. See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
30. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
[Vol. 18:51
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one way or the other, the question of the defendants "predisposi-
tion" to commit the crime is a question of fact for the jury. 31
In the opinion of the Sorrells majority, this view supposedly
derives from an unexpressed intent of Congress:
"[flundamentally, the question is whether the defense, if the
facts bear it out, takes the case out of the purview of the statute
because it cannot be supposed that the Congress intended that
the letter of its enactment should be used to support such a
gross perversion of its purpose."
3 2
Although many courts and commentators have criticized
the predisposition test for entrapment, 33 the concurring opin-
ions of Justice Roberts in Sorrells34 and Justice Frankfurter in
Sherman35 have been most influential in noting the flaws in this
approach. As Justice Frankfurter said, the subjective approach
is based on an interpretation of Congressional intent which is:
sheer fiction .... [Tihe only legislative intention that can with
any show of reason be extracted from the statute is the intention
to make criminal precisely the conduct in which the defendant
has engaged ....
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not be-
cause his conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute, but
because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on
behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be
countenanced....
... A false choice is put when it is said that either the defend-
ant's conduct does not fall within the statute or he must be con-
victed. The statute is wholly directed to defining . . . the
substantive offense concerned and expresses no purpose . . . re-
garding the . . . conduct that will be tolerated in detection of
crime. A statute prohibiting the sale of narcotics is as silent on
the question of entrapment as it is on the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence. 36
31. Russell, 411 U.S. at 440 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
32. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
33. See Scott C. Paton, "The Government Made Me Do It": A Proposed Ap-
proach To Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995
(1994); Sherrill, supra note 2; Stephen G. Mirakian, Note, Entrapment: Time to
Take an Objective Look, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 324, 336 (1977); Serpent, supra note 2.
34. 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
35. 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 379-81.
1997]
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It is the role of courts to "formulat[e] standards for the adminis-
tration of criminal justice when Congress .. .has not specifi-
cally legislated to that end .... [T]o look to a statute for
guidance in the application of a policy not remotely within the
contemplation of Congress at the time of its enactment is to dis-
tort analysis."37
"Since, by definition, the entrapment defense cannot arise
unless the defendant actually committed the proscribed act,
that defendant is manifestly covered by the terms of the crimi-
nal statute involved."38 Even if, as in most cases in which en-
trapment is an issue, the intention that the particular crime be
committed originated with the police and without their induce-
ment the crime would not have occurred, the defendant was
"predisposed" in the sense that he was capable of committing
the crime. 39 If the defendant is to be relieved from the usual
punitive consequences of his acts, it is not because he is inno-
cent of the offense for which he is charged.
That he was induced, provoked, or tempted to do so by govern-
ment agents does not make him any more innocent or any less
predisposed than he would be if he had been induced, provoked, or
tempted by a private person - which... would not entitle him to
cry "entrapment." Since the only difference between these situa-
tions is the identity of the temptor, ... . the significant focus must
be on the conduct of the government agents, and not on the pre-
disposition of the defendant. 40
In short, "it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the 'intention' to com-
mit the crime originated with the defendant or government
officers .... "41
Moreover, making the entrapment defense depend on
whether the defendant has the requisite predisposition permits
the introduction into evidence of hearsay, suspicion, and rumor,
which would be inadmissible in other contexts, in order to prove
the defendant's predisposition.
37. Id. at 381.
38. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, concur-
ring) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 18:51
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Stated another way, this subjective test means that the Govern-
ment is permitted to entrap a person with a criminal record or
bad reputation, and then to prosecute him for the manufactured
crime, confident that his record or reputation itself will be enough
to show that he was predisposed to commit the offense anyway.4 2
"Furthermore, a test that looks to the character and predisposi-
tion of the defendant rather than the conduct of the police loses
sight of the underlying reason for the defense of entrapment. '43
"Equally important is the consideration that a jury verdict,
although it may settle the issue of entrapment in the particular
case, cannot give significant guidance for official conduct in the
future."44 "[A] judgment aimed at blocking off areas of imper-
missible police conduct is appropriate for the court and not the
jury."45
B. The Objective Predisposition Theory
The objective predisposition theory of entrapment was
stated by Justice Frankfurter in Sherman. He said:
in holding out inducements [government officers] should act in
such a manner as is likely to induce to the commission of crime
only these [predisposed] persons and not others who would nor-
mally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary temp-
tations. This test shifts attention from the record and
predisposition of the particular defendant to the conduct of the
police and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would en-
trap only those ready and willing to commit crime. 46
At least fourteen states have adopted the objective ap-
proach. 47 "Moreover, this objective approach is the one favored
42. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
43. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 385.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 384. See also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932)
(Roberts, J., concurring); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944, 948 (9th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
47. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (Michie, 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-209
(Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1986); HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-737
(1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3210 (1995); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.05 (McKinney
1987 & Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1985 & Supp. 1997); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 313 (1983); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (1995 & Supp. 1997); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375
1997]
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by a majority of the commentators." 48 The objective test re-
ceived some support in Hampton v. United States49, where five
Justices subscribed to the view that extreme cases may arise
where the government conduct was so outrageous as to violate
due process even though the evidence permitted the jury to find
that the defendant was predisposed.50 However, since the
Supreme Court has never applied the Due Process Clause to in-
validate a conviction based on outrageous governmental induce-
ment, the factual circumstances that would meet such a
standard remain unclear.
Although the objective predisposition theory is an improve-
ment over the subjective theory because it directs attention to
the conduct of the police, it does so for the same irrelevant pur-
pose, to determine whether a person, hypothetical rather than
actual, would be predisposed to commit the crime in question.
When an entrapment defense is raised in a criminal case, public
policy issues arise, such as whether the entrapment is neces-
sary for efficient law enforcement of the particular crime and
whether the government conduct is appropriate.
As an example of the problems inherent in the objective
predisposition test, consider Carbajal-Portillo v. United
States.5 1 In Carbajal-Portillo, two defendants were convicted by
a jury of having brought sixteen ounces of heroin into the
United States from Mexico. 52 The first defendant carried a
package containing heroin on a 1000 mile journey within Mex-
(Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Mich. 1973); ); State v. Wil-
kins, 473 A.2d 295, 298 (Vt. 1983).
48. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 n.3 (1973) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws § 702, Final Report
(1971); Richard A. Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and
Some State Court Comarisons, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959); Richard C. Don-
nelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocat-
eurs, ,60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Paul W. Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and
Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1959);
Michael Senneff, Comment, Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1 U.S.F.L. REV. 177
(1966-67)).
49. 425 U.S. 484, 491-95 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
50. See id. at 495-500.
51. 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968) (cited in Russell, 411 U.S. at 445 n.3, as an
example of the application of the objective test).
52. See Corbajal-Portillo, 396 F.2d at 945.
[Vol. 18:51
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ico to a city adjacent to the United States border.5 3 When he
arrived at his destination, his contact said that he was unable
to pay and suggested that he cross the border and sell it to a
named man at a designated place. 54 The defendant left the
package in Mexico, crossed the border, met the man, who was in
reality a state narcotics agent, but expressed reluctance to
bring the narcotics into the United States.55 The defendant
asked his contact (the agent) to cross the border so that the sale
could be made in Mexico. 56 After the contact refused, the de-
fendant agreed to bring the narcotics across the border the next
day for an agreed upon price. 57 After returning to Mexico, the
defendant met a local resident in a bar.58 After discovering that
they came from the same state in Mexico and had mutual
friends, the second defendant agreed to transport the heroin
across the border in his car.59 Both defendants were arrested
after they crossed the border.60
The Court held that the first defendant would not have en-
gaged in the illegal narcotics trafficking if his reluctance had
not been overcome. 61 The agent affirmatively persuaded him to
commit the crime in order that he might arrest him. 62 The
Court held that this constituted entrapment as a matter of
law.63 However, with respect to the second defendant, who
agreed to assist by transporting the narcotics across the border,
the Court said that his willingness to participate in the illegal
activity was not affected by the circumstances under which the
first defendant agreed to make the sale.64 Thus, under the objec-
tive predisposition test, we are faced with the situation in which
the principal participant goes free because he was entrapped,
while his lesser confederate was convicted. 65 In terms of balanc-
53. See id.
54. See id. at 945-946.
55. See id. at 946.
56. See id.
57. See Corbajal-Portillo, 396 F.2d at 946.
58. See id. at 947.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Corbajal-Portillo, 396 F.2d at 947.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
11
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ing the interests, which are discussed below, the government's
need for entrapment to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States is substantial, and the extent and nature of gov-
ernment involvement is well within acceptable bounds. There-
fore, both convictions should have been sustained. 66
IV. Balancing the Nature and Extent of Government
Involvement Against the Government's Need
for Entrapment
A. The Six Entrapment Cases Decided by the Supreme Court
The six entrapment cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States are more easily rationalized as balancing the
government's need for entrapment against the nature and ex-
tent of government inducement than they are by the criminal's
subjective or objective predisposition to commit a crime. Bal-
ancing competing interests through trade-offs employs the
method of economic rationality.67 This method allows a judge,
lawyer, or commentator to order cases consistently. However, it
should be noted that the method of economic rationality does
not postulate that it is always possible to order cases in which
judges balance interests via trade-offs, but only that if a consis-
tent ordering is not possible, the inconsistency must be due to a
mistake or conflicting preferences among judges. 68
The six cases involve three types of crimes: one instance of
receiving (as opposed to producing or selling) child pornography
through the mail,69 four cases of selling controlled substances, 70
and one case of alleged solicitation of a bribe for an official act.71
66. See infra part IV.
67. See HAL VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH
120-23 (1987); See also EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS, Chs. 3, 7 (7th ed.
1991); PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS, Chs. 6, 8 & App. (14th
ed. 1992); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS, Chs. 8, 12 & App. (1993).
68. See VARIAN, supra note 69. One or more of the decisions must be in error
because economic rationality is transitive. The property of transitivity in economic
rationality requires a rigorous consistency: it says that if x = y, and y = z, then x =
z; or if x > y, and y > z, then x > z. See id. at 35, 120-23. However, if judges have
conflicting preferences and decisions are made by majority rule, individual ration-
ality may not result in collective rationality. See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE
II, Ch. 5 (revised ed. 1989).
69. See infra pp. 413-17.
70. See infra pp. 417-26.
71. See infra pp. 426-28.
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Police conduct in these cases runs the gamut from surveillance
that was instituted in response to a civilian complaint 72 to an
elaborate two and one-half year campaign conducted by two
government agencies for the purpose of inducing a person to vi-
olate the law.73
1. Jacobson v. United States74
In 1984, Jacobson ordered two magazines by mail, Bare
Boys I and Bare Boys II, which contained photographs of nude
preteen and teenage boys.75 The young men depicted in the
magazines were not engaged in sexual activity, and Jacobson's
receipt of the magazines was legal under both federal and state
law.7 6 Three months later, Congress passed the Child Protec-
tion Act of 1984 making illegal the receipt through the mail of
sexually explicit depictions of children.7 7 Shortly thereafter,
postal inspectors found Jacobson's name on the mailing list of
the bookstore from which he had received the magazines. 78
Over the next two and a half years, two government agencies
repeatedly attempted to induce Jacobson to break the new law
by ordering sexually explicit photographs of children. 79 The
government used five ficticious organizations to facilitate the in-
ducement: The American Hedonist Society, Midlands Data Re-
search, Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow (HINT), Far
Eastern Trading Company, and Produit Outaouais (Canada).
The government also used a bogus pen pal, under the pseudo-
nym Carl Long.80
Acting through these fictitious organizations, government
agents sent material that disparaged the legitimacy and consti-
tutionality of efforts to restrict the availability of sexually ex-
plicit materials. It also exerted substantial pressure on
Jacobson to obtain and read such material as part of a fight
72. See infra p. 426.
73. See infra p. 413.
74. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
75. See id. at 542.
76. See id. at 543.
77. See Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified
as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 2251).
78. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 543.
79. See id. at 543-47.
80. See id.
1997]
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against censorship and the infringement of individual rights.8
For example, HINT described itself as "'an organization
founded to protect and promote sexual freedom and freedom of
choice' and stated that 'the most appropriate means to accom-
plish [its] objectives is to promote honest dialogue among con-
cerned individuals and to continue its lobbying efforts with
State Legislators.' "' 82 Two solicitations raised the spectre of cen-
sorship and suggested that Jacobson ought to be allowed to do
what he had been solicited to do.8 3 The Postal Service's solicita-
tion described the concern about child pornography as "hysteri-
cal nonsense," decried "international censorship," and assured
Jacobson, based on consultation with "American solicitors," that
a mail order that had been posted could not be opened for in-
spection without authorization of a judge.8 4
When, after two and a half years of persuasion by govern-
ment agents, Jacobson ordered Boys Who Love Boys from a cat-
alogue sent to him by one of the fictitious organizations, he was
arrested after delivery of a photocopy of the magazine.8 5 In
Jacobson's home "the government found the Bare Boys
magazines and the materials that the government had sent to
him in the course of its protracted investigation [and solicita-
tion], but no other materials that would indicate that petitioner
collected or was actively interested in child pornography."8 6
Jacobson was convicted of violating a provision of the Child
Protection Act of 1984, which criminalizes the knowing receipt
through the mails of a visual depiction that involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.8 7 The Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed, but then on rehearing affirmed the conviction.88
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
[because the Government overstepped the line between setting a
trap for the "unwary innocent" and the "unwary criminal," . . .
and as a matter of law failed to establish that petitioner was inde-
81. See id. at 546-47.
82. Id. at 552 (quoting Record, Defendant's exhibit 13).
83. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 546-47.
84. Id. at 547.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1984 & Supp. 1997).
88. See United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999 affd 916 F.2d 467 (1990) (en
banc).
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pendently predisposed to commit the crime for which he was ar-
rested, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming his
conviction.8 9
The Court said that the evidence that Jacobson was ready and
willing to commit the offenses came only after the government
had devoted two and a half years to convincing him that he had,
or should have had, the right to engage in the very behavior
proscribed by law. Moreover, the Court stated that "[h]ad the
agents .. . simply offered [Jacobson] the opportunity to order
child pornography though the mails, and... [h]e had promptly
availed himself of this criminal opportunity, it is unlikely that
his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury
instruction."90
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor said that although the gov-
ernment agents admittedly did not offer Jacobson the chance to
buy child pornography right away, the Court had previously
held that a defendant's predisposition is to be assessed as of the
time the government agents first suggested the crime, not when
the government agent first became involved. 91 However, in the
last paragraph of her dissenting opinion, she stated forthrightly
the essence of the case: "The crux of the Court's concern in this
case is that the Government went too far and 'abused' the
'processes of detection and enforcement' by luring an innocent
person to violate the law."92
In Figure 1, Jacobson and the Supreme Court's other five
entrapment cases, which are discussed below, are depicted in
relation to two competing policy issues that are balanced
through trade-offs: the government's need for entrapment and
89. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542. See also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369, 372 (1958).
90. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549-550. "It is well settled that the fact that officers
or employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem
may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises." Sorrels v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (citations omitted).
91. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 555-56 (O'Connor, dissenting). Justice
O'Connor feared that "the Court's opinion could be read to prohibit the Govern-
ment from advertising the seductions of criminal activity as part of its sting opera-
tion," and that such a restriction "would be especially likely to hamper sting
operations such as this one, which mimic the advertising done by genuine purvey-
ors of pornography." Id. at 557-58.
92. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
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the nature and extent of government inducement. The relative
need for entrapment, from little to great, is ranked on the hori-
zontal axis. The nature and extent of police inducement from
simple solicitation to elaborate and prolonged entrapment
schemes is ranked on the vertical axis. Jacobson is depicted in
the upper left hand corner of Figure 1; it belongs at the intersec-
tion of a relatively high value on the Nature and Extent of Gov-
ernment Inducement axis because the tactics employed violate
fundamental fairness,93 and of a relatively low value on the
93. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) was the first case in
which a federal court clearly sustained a claim of entrapment by government of-
ficers as a defense to an indictment. A federal agent lured Woo Wai, a Chinese
merchant who had resided for many years in San Francisco, into an illegal immi-
gration scheme. The purpose of the scheme was to place Woo Wai in a position
where he would disclose facts of which he was suspected to have knowledge,
knowledge not shown to be derived from unlawful acts of his own, but which re-
lated only to the unlawful acts of other persons-certain officers of the Immigra-
tion Commission at San Francisco. See id. at 413.
The agent employed a detective who approached Woo Wai and suggested to
him that he knew a scheme by which they could make money. Without disclosing
the nature of the scheme, the detective induced Woo Wai to accompany him to San
Diego, more than 500 miles away. The expenses of Woo Wai and the detective
were paid by the government. The detective introduced Woo Wai to local immigra-
tion inspectors at San Diego, who had been informed of the nature of the plan. In
their presence, the detective made the proposition that they permit Woo Wai to
bring Chinese across the Mexican border, for which they should receive $50 a
head. The inspectors assured him that no arrest would be made or they too would
go to jail. See id. Woo Wai declined. After returning to San Francisco, the detec-
tive again urged Woo Wai to carry out the scheme. Subsequently Woo Wai, accom-
panied by his partner and an agent, went to San Diego a second time and had
another interview with the inspectors, "and again Woo Wai and his partner re-
turned to San Francisco, for the reason, as Woo Wai testified, that he did not like
to handle this kind of work." Id. at 419. Nearly a year later, the detective was still
urging Woo Wai to enter into the scheme. One of the inspectors Woo Wai had met
in San Diego wrote several letters to him for the same purpose, detailing how the
scheme could be carried out and methods of avoiding arrest. The inspector went so
far as to go to San Francisco to interview Woo Wai. It was not until more than a
year and a half after the scheme was initiated "that Woo Wai finally assented to
enter into the scheme that had been so assiduously and persistently urged upon
him." Id.
The trial court charged the jury that even if they believed the defendant, those
facts would not constitute a valid defense in law to the charges. See id. at 413.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
Woo Wai, 223 F. at 416. The Court said there was no evidence that, prior to the
time when the detective first approached Woo Wai, that any of the defendants had
ever been engaged in the unlawful importation of illegal Chinese immigrants. One
of the grounds for reversal was that, "it is against public policy to sustain a convic-
tion obtained in the manner which is disclosed by the evidence in this case . ... "
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/4
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Id. at 415.
In terms of Figure 1, the nature and extent of government involvement in Woo
Wai is as egregious as that in Jacobson; and, while the offense of unlawful impor-
tation of illegal immigrants is arguably more serious than one instance of receiving
pornography through the mail, Woo Wai should be depicted well within the upper
left quadrant in which there is entrapment as a matter of law.
94. In United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969), government
investigators placed an advertisement in Swingers Life Magazine, initiating the
correspondence that culminated in defendant's mailing of obscene films. Although
several of the defendant's letters did reflect an interest in buying and selling fims,
such activity is not an indictable offense and none of the material evidence
presented by the government reflected defendant's intention to violate federal law
by using the mails for delivery of obscene films. The evidence at trial clearly indi-
cated that defendant used the mails only because his correspondent (a federal
agent) insisted that he do so. The defendant's past correspondence showed that he
was primarily interested in meeting other people who shared his enjoyment of ex-
tra-marital or unusual sexual activities. Indeed, the record shows that on at least
two occasions he was successful in meeting a sexual partner through responding to
advertisements such as the one placed by the government. See id. at 978. The
court said that "[tihe doctrine of entrapment focuses both upon the Government's
conduct and defendant's criminal predisposition, but the thrust of the doctrine is to
enjoin the government from acting in improper ways." Id. at 979. The court re-
versed defendant's conviction, stating that "[t]o sustain a conviction in this case
would be to give judicial approval to methods of law enforcement which can only in
the long run contaminate the temple of justice itself." Id. at 979. In terms of Fig-
ure 1, Kros would be depicted just below Jacobson, well within the area of acquit-
tal as a matter of law.
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Figure 1
2. Sherman v. U.S.95
A government informant first met Sherman at a doctor's of-
fice where both were being treated for narcotics addiction.96
The informant, who was under criminal indictment for illegally
selling narcotics, had agreed to aid federal agents in appre-
hending other sellers of illegal drugs in return for a reduced jail
term. 97 Subsequently, he received a suspended sentence. 98 The
informant testified that although he believed Sherman was un-
dergoing treatment for narcotics addiction, he nonetheless
sought to persuade him to obtain and sell narcotics. 99 In subse-
quent meetings, the informant engaged Sherman in conversa-
tions concerning mutual experiences regarding their narcotics
addiction. 100 The informant then appealed to Sherman's sympa-
thies by asking Sherman to supply him with narcotics because
he was not responding to treatment. 10 At first, Sherman tried
to avoid the issue. 0 2 The informant testified that he first had to
overcome Sherman's refusal, then his evasiveness, and finally
his hesitancy in order to achieve capitulation. 0 3 Only after sev-
eral requests over an extended period of time, predicated on the
informant's presumed suffering, did Sherman finally acqui-
esce. 10 4 The informant not only caused Sherman to procure a
source of narcotics, but apparently also induced him to return to
the habit. 105 Sherman obtained narcotics which he shared with
the informant who in turn shared in the cost of the narcotics,
95. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
96. See id. at 371.
97. See id. at 373-74.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 373.
100. See id. at 371.
101. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 373.
104. See id. at 371.
105. See id. at 373. The government introduced Sherman's two past narcotics
convictions as evidence of Sherman's predisposition to commit the crime. The
Supreme Court held that a nine-year old sales conviction and a five-year old pos-
session conviction were insufficient to prove Sherman was ready to sell narcotics
when the informant approached him, especially where the record established that
he was trying to overcome his narcotics habit. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375-76.
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the taxi fare and other expenses necessary to obtain the drug. 0 6
After several such sales, the informant, who had been the insti-
gator of at least two other prosecutions, told federal agents that
he had another seller for them. 10 7 On three separate occasions,
government agents observed Sherman pass narcotics to the in-
formant in return for money supplied by the government. 08
When Sherman's apartment was searched after his arrest, no
narcotics were found. 0 9 There was also no evidence that Sher-
man was involved in the narcotics trade."0
Sherman's conviction for the illegal sale of narcotics was
subsequently overturned by the Second Circuit due to improper
jury instructions relating to the issue of entrapment."' Sher-
man's second trial resulted in a conviction that was overturned
by the Supreme Court which held that he was entrapped as a
matter of law." 2 The federal agent in charge of the case testi-
fied that he approved the set-up without question. The Court,
however stated that the government cannot make such use of
an informant and then claim disassociation though ignorance 113
because, "law enforcement does not require methods such as
this." 4
106. See id. at 371.
107. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373-74.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 375.
110. See id.
111. See Sherman v. United States, 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.).
112. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373.
113. See id. at 373-74. With respect to the facts of this case Justice Frank-
furter, concurring, said "it is clear that the Court in fact reverses the conviction
because of the conduct of the informant Kalchinian, and not because the Govern-
ment has failed to draw a convincing picture of petitioner's past criminal conduct."
Id. at 383.
114. Id. at 376. In Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), the
court held that there was no entrapment because defendants had a predisposition
to manufacture and sell bootleg whiskey from the time the federal agent first con-
tacted them. The convictions were nevertheless reversed because the government
may not, "involve itself so directly and continuously over such a long period of time
in the creation and maintenance of criminal operations, and yet prosecute its col-
laborators." Id. at 787. This decision was disapproved of in United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1973).
A federal agent, who posed as a member of the "Syndicate" and wanted to
purchase large quantities of illegal liquor, was introduced to defendants by an in-
formant. See Green, 454 F.2d at 784. Defendants sold the agent eight gallons of
illegal liquor, after which federal agents raided a still on defendant's property. See
id. Defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to six months in jail. See id.
19
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Because the government was responsible for this elaborate
and prolonged attempt to induce Sherman to sell controlled sub-
stances, the conduct in Sherman is depicted at a relatively high
value on the Nature and Extent of Government Inducement
axis. Although the conduct in Sherman is as inappropriate as
the conduct in Jacobson, the conduct in Sherman is depicted at
a slightly lower value because the government's conduct in
Sherman is indirect and based on negligence, rather than di-
rect and intentional as in Jacobson. On the Government's Need
for Entrapment axis, Sherman is depicted at a slightly higher
value than Jacobson because there is a greater need to appre-
hend those who instigate or peddle illegal materials or sub-
stances (pornography and drugs, for example) than those who
receive them.115 This is especially true if the seller is involved in
more than a single instance." 6
While defendants were out on bail and awaiting sentencing, the agent, whose true
identity was still unknown to defendants, initiated telephone contact with one of
the defendants concerning further relationship between them. See id. This rees-
tablishment of contact occurred at a time when the agent would ordinarily have
had no reason to recontact the defendants, because his earlier undercover work
had been successfully completed. See id. at 786. "Second, the course of events
which led to the [subsequent] arrests was of extremely long duration, lasting ap-
proximately two and one-half years if measured from the defendants' 1963 release
from jail, or three and one-half years if measured from the [agent's] reinitiation of
contact." Greene, 454 F.2d at 786. Third, the agent's involvement in the bootleg-
ging activities was also substantial in nature, treating defendants as partners and
offering to provide a still, a still site, still equipment, and an operator. See id. He
actually provided two thousand pounds of sugar at wholesale. See id. Fourth, the
agent pressured defendants into producing bootleg alcohol. See id. at 787. Fifth,
the federal agent helped reestablish, and then sustain, criminal operations that
had ceased with the first convictions. See id. "Finally, throughout the entire period
involved, the government agent was the only customer of the illegal operation he
had helped to create." See Greene, 454 F.2d at 787.
In terms of Figure 1, this selling of controlled substances case belongs at or
above Sherman on the Nature and Extent of Government Involvement axis, well
within the upper left hand area where defendants are acquitted as a matter of law.
115. See id. at 784.
116. In United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933), two salesmen,
who had plead guilty to selling obscene stories and pictures which defendant fur-
nished to them, agreed to become decoys in a plan to capture the defendant engag-
ing in similar conduct. The court held that the defendant, who regularly sold and
distributed obscene matter, was not entrapped notwithstanding that federal
agents had instigated the violation in question. See id. at 1008. In terms of Figure
1, this case would be depicted at a very low level on the Nature and Extent of
Government Involvement axis (simple solicitation) and at the level of selling illegal
substances on the Need for Entrapment axis, well within the area where defend-
ants are not entrapped as a matter of law.
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3. Sorrells v. United States 117
During the "prohibition" era, when the sale of liquor was
illegal, a federal agent visited Sorrell's home, posing as a tour-
ist.118 Accompanying the agent were three local residents who
were all well aquainted with the defendant. 1 9 At trial, one resi-
dent stated that the agent was introduced as a furniture dealer
from Charlotte. 20 The agent, who was the only person among
those present who said anything about procuring liquor, told
the defendant that he wished to purchase a half gallon of whis-
key to take back to Charlotte for a friend. In response, the de-
fendant stated that, "he did not fool with whiskey."' 2 ' The
agent made a second request of the defendant which was
equally unsuccessful. 122 During a conversation which lasted ap-
proximately one and a half hours, the agent learned that de-
fendant and another witness were World War I veterans who
had served in the 30th Division. The agent himself had served
in that same division. The conversation turned to their war ex-
periences, whereafter the agent again asked defendant if he
could get him some liquor. 123 There was conflicting testimony
as to whether the agent asked the defendant to sell liquor to
him a total of three times or as many as five times before the
defendant acquiesced.12 The defendant finally agreed to, "see if
he could get a half gallon of liquor."125 The defendant left the
group and returned about twenty or thirty minutes later with
the liquor. 26 The agent then paid the defendant five dollars for
the liquor. 27 A witness, who had been in the 30th Division, tes-
tified that he believed that one former war buddy would get li-
117. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
118. See id. at 439.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 440.
121. See id.
122. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 440.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 439-41. Witnesses for the defendant testified as to his good
character and that they had never heard of him being in the liquor business. To
rebut this testimony, the government called three witnesses who testified that the
defendant had the general reputation of a rum runner. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at
439-41.
127. See id. at 439.
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quor for another. There was also conflicting evidence as to
whether the defendant had a reputation as a "rum runner."128
Sorrells was convicted of selling one-half gallon of whiskey
in violation of the National Prohibition Act. 129 The trial court
found, as a matter of law, that there was no entrapment and
thus did not submit the entrapment issue to the jury. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed 130 and the Supreme Court reversed the
decision, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to submit
the issue of entrapment to the jury.13'
128. See id. at 439-40.
129. See id. at 438.
130. See United States v. Sorrells, 57 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1932).
131. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452. For a discussion of Justice Roberts' dis-
senting opinion, see supra notes 4 and 12, and accompanying text. In Butts v.
United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921), the defendant, who in 14 years had 18
operations for tuberculosis of the bones, was addicted to the pain reliever, mor-
phine. He had never sold or dealt in the drug prior to the transaction which
formed the basis for his prosecution. A government informant, who was also ad-
dicted to morphine, was acquainted with the defendant but had never obtained
any morphine from the defendant prior to the transaction for which the defendant
was prosecuted. The informant, who had served jail time for violation of the Nar-
cotics Act and had recently been arrested for another violation, was told that he
would be released if he agreed to act as a government informant. He called the
defendant on the telephone and told him that he was interested in obtaining some
morphine. See id. at 37. When the defendant replied that he had none, the in-
formant asked him if he could get an ounce of morphine. The defendant replied
that he did not have any morphine himself, and that he could not get any. The
informant called again the next day and again the defendant told him that he had
no morphine. When the informant renewed his request for morphine, defendant
agreed to get some morphine, for which the informant paid $190. The court of
appeals held that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on entrap-
ment as requested by defendant's counsel. See id. at 38.
In Lutfy v. United States, 198 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1952), which also involved the
sale of narcotics, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court erred in declining to
instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment in view of conflicting testimony;
defendant's testimony, if believed, portrayed impermissible actions by enforcement
officers, inducing defendant to commit the crime. The defendant alleged that the
government's witness had become a close friend and drinking companion of his,
and that the witness entrapped him by making an appeal to his sympathy for a
fictitious heroin addict who needed heroin. See id. at 761.
In Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933), the trial court erred in
not submitting to the jury the question of whether government agents took unfair
advantage of the sympathy defendant would naturally have for a person he
thought was addicted to morphine and with whom he formerly had illicit intimate
relations. The court held that if defendant acted solely upon the belief that by
doing so he would alleviate her suffering, and he was not in any other way inter-
ested in the unlawful sale, this would amount to entrapment. See id. at 994.
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Although Sorrells is similar to Sherman in that in both
cases defendants were induced to sell controlled substances
through an appeal to empathy and fellowship, the solicitations
in Sorrells were not as morally blameworthy as in Sherman.
Causing a person to return to drug abuse for the purpose of re-
ducing one's own jail sentence, as was the case in Sherman, is
more unscrupulous than an appeal to violate the law based on
common war experience. Additionally, the Sherman entrap-
ment scheme was much more prolonged than that in Sorells.
This analysis is borne out by the Supreme Court's rulings in
these cases. In Sherman, the Court held that there was entrap-
ment as a matter of law, 132 while in Sorrells the Court held that
the issue should have been submitted to the jury.133 Thus, in
Figure 1, Sorrells is depicted at a relatively low level on the
Nature and Extent of Government Inducement axis; it is de-
picted at the same level on the horizontal Need for Entrapment
axis because both cases involve the sale of controlled sub-
stances. Since the Supreme Court's holding that the entrap-
ment scheme in Sorrells is a question for the jury, it is depicted
in the area between cases like Sherman and Hampton34 (dis-
cussed below). Sherman is ranked higher than Sorrells because
where there is entrapment as a matter of law, the nature and
extent of government inducement outweighs the need for en-
trapment. On the other hand, cases like Hampton are ranked
below Sorrells because there is no entrapment as a matter of
law; and because the need for entrapment outweighs the nature
and extent of government inducement.
4. United States v. Russel' 35
In Russell, a federal agent went to the defendants' home
and offered to supply the chemical phenyl-2-propanone, an es-
sential, difficult to procure, but legal ingredient in the manufac-
ture of methamphetamine ("speed"), in return for half of the
Numerous cases affirming convictions after the issue had been properly sub-
mitted to the jury are cited in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 n.8
(1958). In terms of Figure 1, these cases would be depicted at or close to Sorrells.
132. See supra note 113.
133. See supra note 130.
134. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
135. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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drug produced. 136 During the conversation, one of the defend-
ants revealed that he had been making the drug for six months.
He took the agent to a methamphetamine laboratory where the
agent observed an empty bottle with the chemical label phenyl-
2-propanone. As arranged, the agent returned with a supply of
phenyl-2-propanone and observed the manufacturing process.
The following morning, the agent was given one-half of the drug
and bought the other half for $60.13' About one month later, the
agent returned and the defendant sold him more
methamphetamine. Three days later, the agent returned with a
search warrant and seized several items, including an empty
bottle of phenyl-2-propanone and another partially filled bottle
of the same. 138
Russell and two codefendants were convicted of unlawfully
manufacturing and selling processed methamphetamine. The
defendant conceded that the jury could have found him predis-
posed to commit the offenses. 39 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the convic-
tion and concluded that there was entrapment as a matter of
law solely for the reason that a undercover agent supplied an
essential chemical for manufacturing the drug. 140 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that, "a defense to a criminal charge may be
founded upon an intolerable degree of governmental participa-
tion in the criminal enterprise."' 4 ' The Supreme Court, in re-
versing the decision stated that, "[wihile we may some day be
presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
136. See id. at 425-27.
137. See id. at 426.
138. See id. at 425-27. In Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), an un-
dercover federal narcotics agent, who had misrepresented his identity on the tele-
phone, was twice invited to the home of petitioner for the purpose of executing
unlawful narcotics transactions. See id. at 207. The defendant did not raise an
entrapment defense but argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
The Supreme Court sustained the conviction and held that when a home is opened
as a place of illegal business, the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a gov-
ernment agent entered pursuant to an invitation and did not see, hear, or take
anything unrelated to the business purpose of his visit. See id. at 211. In terms of
Figure 1, Lewis would be depicted at or near Russell.
139. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
140. See id. at 424.
141. See id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.
1972)).
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absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction, . . . the instant case is distinctly not of
that breed."14 2 The Court further stated that the agent's contri-
bution of phenyl-2-propanone to the criminal enterprise already
in progress was scarcely objectionable. 143 The chemical itself is
harmless, and its possession is legal. Additionally, the Court
found that while the government may have been seeking to
make it more difficult for drug rings such as the defendant's to
obtain the chemical, the evidence nonetheless indicated that the
chemical was obtainable. Here, the law enforcement conduct
stopped far short of violating that, "fundamental fairness
[which is] shocking to the universal sense of justice." 44 Thus,
since the Court held that there was no entrapment as a matter
of law, Russell should be placed below Sherman on the Nature
and Extent of Government Inducement axis in Figure 1. Since
both cases involve the sale of controlled substances, the cases
are at the same level on the Need for Entrapment axis.
5. Hampton v. United States 45
According to the testimony of a government informant, de-
fendant observed "track" (needle) marks on the informant's
arms while they were "shooting" pool. The defendant then told
the informant that he needed money and that he could get some
heroin for him. 46 The informant responded that he could find a
buyer, and the defendant suggested that he do so. The inform-
ant called a government agent and arranged for a sale. After
two federal agents posed as narcotics dealers and bought heroin
from the defendant on two separate occasions, the defendant
was arrested. 147 The defendant's version of the events was
quite different; he claimed that all of the drugs he sold were
supplied by the informant. 48
142. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the subjective predisposition theory of the entrapment defense as set
forth in the majority opinions in Sorrells and Sherman. See id. at 435-36.
143. See id. at 432.
144. See id. at 432 (citing Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 246 (1960)).
145. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
146. See id. at 485-86.
147. See id. at 486.
148. See id. at 486-87.
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The defendant was convicted on two counts of selling her-
oin. 149 On appeal before the Supreme Court, the defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime was assumed to have been
established. 50 The issue concerned the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury that the defendant should be acquitted as a
matter of law if the drugs were supplied to him by an informant
acting on behalf of the government. The Supreme Court held
that the supplying of illegal drugs in a narcotics investigation is
not illegal as a matter of law.151 In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Powell stated that the Court, "recognized that the practical-
ities of combating the narcotics traffic frequently require law
enforcement officers legitimately to supply 'some item of value
that the drug ring requires.'"152 Since the defendant initiated
the discussion concerning the sale of drugs according to the in-
formant, whose testimony was found to be credible by the jury,
the nature and extent of government inducement in Hampton is
slightly less than solicitation which is initiated by the govern-
ment or its agents. 5 3 Thus, with respect to the Nature and Ex-
tent of Government Inducement axis of Figure 1, Hampton
should be placed below Russell.
6. United States v. Mathews 54
Mathews, an employee of the Small Business Administra-
tion, [hereinafter "SBA"I was responsible for a government pro-
gram which provided aid to small businesses. Under the
program, the SBA obtained government contracts, subcon-
tracted them to program participants, and assisted them in per-
forming the same. The president of one of the participating
149. See id. at 485.
150. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489.
151. See id. at 488-89. If police engage in illegal activity beyond the scope of
their duties, while acting in concert with a defendant, the remedy lies not in free-
ing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police. See id. at 490.
See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976).
152. See id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432
(1973)).
153. The Court said that the government played a more significant role in
enabling petitioner to sell contraband in Hampton, where it supplied an illegal
drug, than it did in Russell, where it supplied a legal ingredient which was used in
the manufacture of an illegal drug. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489.
154. 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
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companies believed that Mathews was not providing his com-
pany with certain program benefits because he had refused Ma-
thews' repeated requests for personal loans. 155 As a result of his
complaint to a government official, federal agents launched an
investigation of Mathews. 156 Under surveillance, the business-
man offered Mathews a loan that, according to the business-
man, Mathews had previously requested. 157 Mathews agreed to
accept the loan. Two months later, the businessman met Ma-
thews at a restaurant and gave him the money. Mathews was
immediately arrested and charged with accepting a gratuity in
exchange for an official act. 58
The district court characterized the evidence of entrapment
as, "shaky at best," 59 but rather than premise its denial of Ma-
thews' motion for a jury instruction on that ground, the court
held as a matter of law that Mathews was not entitled to an
entrapment instruction. This rested on the fact that he did not
admit having committed the crime. 60 Mathews was subse-
155. See id. at 60.
156. See id. In Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928), a jailer suspected
that a lawyer was smuggling narcotics into prison while visiting inmates. A
scheme was devised to entrap him whereby a prisoner paid the lawyer to procure
morphine. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the lawyer's convic-
tion. Justice Brandeis dissented. He said that, "the prosecution must fail because
officers of the Government instigated the commission of the alleged crime." Id. at
421.
The fact that no objection on the ground of entrapment was taken by the
defendant, either below or in this Court, is without legal significance. This
prosecution should be stopped, not because some right of [defendant's] has
been denied, but in order to protect the Government. To protect it from ille-
gal conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts.
Id. at 424.
Justice Brandeis's overbroad view of entrapment is similar to that expressed
by Justice Roberts in Sorrells. See supra accompanying text note 18. To the con-
.trary, the smuggling of illegal drugs into prison by a lawyer, who by virtue of his
position is an officer of the court, is a very serious breach of public trust. In such
cases, the government's need for entrapment, in order to protect the integrity of
prisons, is much higher than in "street" sale cases; moreover, unlike Sherman or
Sorrells where there was an unfair emotional appeal to sympathy and fellowship,
the lawyer was merely given an opportunity to break the law. Thus, in terms of
Figure 1, Casey should be depicted in the lower right hand corner, near Mathews,
where there is no entrapment as a matter of law.
157. See Mathews, 485 U.S. at 60.
158. See id. at 61.
159. Id. at 62.
160. See id.
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quently convicted of accepting a bribe in exchange for an official
act.161 The case reached the Supreme Court on a procedural is-
sue rather than the merits: did the district court err in ruling
as a matter of law that Mathews was not entitled to an entrap-
ment instruction because he refused to admit committing the
crime?16 2 The Supreme Court, citing examples such as where a
defendant charged with manslaughter is also entitled to plead
self-defense, held that defendants in criminal cases are entitled
to plead inconsistent defenses and reversed Mathews' convic-
tion.163 Under the interest balancing test for entrapment,
where the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime is ir-
relevant, the procedural issue decided by the Supreme Court in
Mathews would not have arisen.
On the merits, Mathews is depicted in the lower right cor-
ner of Figure 1, at a relatively low value on the Nature and Ex-
tent of Government Inducement axis. Because the entrapment
scheme was not initiated by the government, but was com-
menced in response to a private citizen's complaint, it amounts
to even less government inducement than in cases where solici-
tation is initiated by the government. It also maintains a rela-
tively high value in terms of the seriousness of the crime,
because selling official acts, which is the type of crime that if
unchecked would completely undermine the public's trust in
government, 64 is an extremely serious offense. 6 5
161. See id. at 61-62.
162. See Mathews at 62.
163. See id. at 62-66.
164. Such crime is endemic in many third world countries.
165. In United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983), a former
United States Senator and his associate were found guilty of bribery and related
offenses arising out of the "Abscam" investigation. The Senator promised to use his
position to help obtain government contracts for the purchase of titanium from a
mining venture in which he held an interest. The promises were made in connec-
tion with a proposed loan of $100 million to have been financed ostensibly by a
fictitious entity purporting to be an enterprise of two wealthy Arab sheiks and a
second Arab group's offer to purchase the mining venture for a sum that would
have yielded the owners of the venture an estimated $70 million profit. Among
other defenses, the Senator contended that the methods used by government
agents exceeded an outer limit of fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause.
Specifically, those engaged in the "sting" operation endeavored to put words in the
Senator's mouth. The Court said that there is no, "indication that the 'coaching'
was persistently directed at an unwilling subject in an unconscionable effort to
erode his law-abiding instincts." Id. at 620. The Court also noted that since the
financial inducement of $100 million was initially discussed in connection with
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V. Interest Balancing Via Trade-Offs and Line
Drawing by Judges
Balancing competing interests through trade-offs is central
to economic rationality.166 When judges, and lawyers who repli-
cate the reasoning of judges, balance interests through trade-
offs, they often use the deductive reasoning of economic ration-
ality to engage in line drawing, that is, the separation of cases
that should be decided one way from cases that should be de-
cided the other way. As indicated above, economic rationality
what appeared to be an entirely legitimate business transaction, it recognized that
the subtle shifting of a legitimate proposal into an unlawful one had the potential
for presenting a jury with close questions of intent and thus risked incorrect fact-
finding. However, the Court said that the clarity of the evidence placed this case
well short of any point at which it might be apprehensive that the verdicts had
been rendered questionable by governmentally-created ambiguities in the presen-
tation of a criminal opportunity to a target. See id. at 613-14. See also United
States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Murphy, 642 F.2d
699 (2d Cir. 1980); and in affirming their convictions, United States v. Myers, 692
F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
In Figure 1, Williams should be depicted at a high value on the axis which
measures the nature and extent of government involvement in view of the elabo-
rate nature of the "sting" operation, as well as the subtle shift from a legitimate
proposal to an unlawful one. However, given the seriousness of the crime, bribery
of a high public official, Williams should also be depicted at a high value on the
axis representing the government's need for entrapment. Since the seriousness of
the crime justifies extensive government involvement, the entrapment defense
should not be allowed.
In United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), a North Carolina state
district judge, who presided over misdemeanor cases and traffic offenses, was con-
victed of accepting bribes. He alleged entrapment. The court of appeals sustained
his conviction on the ground that a ready response to solicitation showed predispo-
sition. The prosecution arose from an undercover investigation of corruption by
federal agents after they received information from several individuals that they
could bribe ("deliver") the judge. A federal agent presented himself to an interme-
diary as a representative of a criminal syndicate that was interested in making
financial investments in the area as a front for various illegal activities, and
needed protection from local authorities. The intermediary introduced the defend-
ant to federal agents, who met him at a motel for an exploratory meeting. No
explicit offer of money was made at that meeting. At subsequent meetings, the
defendant accepted money in return for protection of the planned gambling ven-
ture. The defendant also agreed to set low bonds for those arrested for drug deal-
ing. The defendant further agreed to "take care" of traffic tickets and help the
agent get a license for a business that would be a drug smuggling front. See id. at
1079-82. Although the nature and extent of government involvement is substan-
tially greater than in Mathews, the seriousness of official bribery justifies the en-
trapment scheme. In terms of Figure 1, this case would be depicted within the
area of no entrapment as a matter of law.
166. See supra note 38.
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does not postulate that all cases in which judges balance inter-
ests via trade-offs must be capable of a consistent ordering, but
only that if a consistent ordering is not possible the inconsis-
tency must be due to a mistake or conflicting preferences among
judges. 167 As an example of how the logic of balancing interests
via trade-offs aids in line drawing, consider a controlled sub-
stance entrapment case in relation to the four controlled sub-
stance cases depicted in Figure 1. For ease of reference, these
four cases are reproduced in Figure 2.
Nature and Sherman Entrapment as a Matter of Law
Extent of
Government 111111111111111111
Inducement i Sorrells' Jury IssueIII IIIII II 111111
Russell No Entrapment as a Matter of LawI
Hampton No Entrapment as a Matter of Law
0
Figure 2
If the facts of a controlled substance case require that it be
ranked at or below Russell on the Nature and Extent of Govern-
ment Inducement axis, there is no entrapment as a matter of
law. If, however, the case is ranked at or above Sherman on the
same axis, there is entrapment as a matter of law. If the case
ranks close to Sorrells in terms of the Nature and Extent of
Government Inducement, it is one about which reasonable per-
sons can differ. As case law develops and precedents accumu-
late, the gray area between Sherman and Russell may become
narrowed. If a court determines that there is entrapment as a
matter of law in a case that ranks below Sherman yet above
Sorrells in terms of the Nature and Extent of Government In-
ducement, the area between Sherman and Russell shrinks.
This use of deductive reasoning is quite general. For example,
whenever courts engage in balancing of interests through trade-
167. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
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offs and a Case Y, which was decided one way, can be sand-
wiched between a Case X, whose outcome is in question, and a
Case Z, which was decided the other way, economic rationality
requires that Case X be decided like Case Y (X-Y-Z).
VI. Conclusion
An analysis of entrapment cases demonstrates that these
cases are more easily rationalized as balancing interests via
trade-offs between the government's need for entrapment and
the nature and extent of government involvement, rather than
by a defendant's predisposition to commit a crime. The "predis-
position test" for entrapment, whether subjective or objective, is
irrelevant to the real public policy issues which concern (A) the
extent to which entrapment is necessary for efficient law en-
forcement, considering factors such as the crime's seriousness,
secrecy, and difficulty of detection; and (B) the nature and ex-
tent of government involvement, from surveillance to simple so-
licitation and to elaborate and prolonged inducement.'
Moreover, the "predisposition test," which allows juries to hear
evidence which is unduly prejudicial to the defendant, can re-
sult in entrapment decisions which are inconsistent with these
policies.
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